'Prepare! Prepare!' does not do for a slogan. No more does 'business as usual.' […] No slogan works. 1 At the height of the Munich crisis in autumn 1938, when war seemed imminent, the hurried digging of miles of shallow trenches in public parks exposed the limits of government preparations for air raids.
3 planners in much the same way as more optimistic visions. It is the interaction of unpredictability, fantasy and anxiety that shaped the imagined futures sketched out by architects and planners in this period.
Plans are only ever a vision of a possible future, but if in urban planning, as Guy Ortolano states, 'expectations about the future were filtered through assumptions about the present' then the case of plans for permanent air raid precautions (ARP) is instructive.
11 It illustrates how expectations of future air war impacted upon contemporary perceptions of the built environment and the plans for urban futures, while highlighting how urban space and expert knowledge were brought into war planning during peacetime. By analysing how policymakers and professionals concerned with the future of cities understood ARP as an element within more general considerations for future urban and industrial development, this article engages with the question of how the fear of air raids was, in Lewis Mumford's words, 'fixed into routine'.
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Air Raids as an Architectural Problem
In June 1936 Colonel William Garforth spoke at the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) in
London. His address, subsequently published in the August issue of the Journal of the RIBA, detailed the official understanding of the effects of future air raids, and outlined current preparations.
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Garforth was a member of the Air Raid Precautions Department which had been established in the Home Office in May 1935. 14 His address reflected how the government increasingly placed ARP in the public eye and was part of a series of lectures on 'the principles of protection in air raids' to factories owners, business organisations and local chambers of commerce. 15 The Department was an extension and formalisation of the sub-committee that had reported to the Committee of Imperial Defence since 1924. 16 With a formal position in the Home Office, it gained a prominent role in governmental planning and preparation for a future war. The move reflected the shift in the focus of discussions about air war to the protection of British cities; the increasingly public official discussions of the dangers of air raids; and, perhaps most significantly, the positioning of air raid precautions within an ostensibly civilian peacetime government department. 15 Garforth, 'A Few Principles of Protection', 985. 16 For the establishment of the Sub-Committee and their first report which emphasized the 'moral effect' and the inevitability of civilian casualties see Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire, 124-138.
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The Department's first major public act was to issue a memorandum on measures to be taken for ARP by central government, industrial and commercial employers, householders and local authorities. 17 The circular was made publicly available before being published in The Times in July. 18 The government's interest in ARP had led them to approach technical experts to offer advice on passive defence. The professionals who might be involved in the design and building of the structures that could shield civilians from bombs were increasingly preoccupied with, at times highly politicized, debates about ARP. 19 Architectural journals increasingly discussed structural precautions and called for more clarity from the government. The voice of the architect in ARP debates had been officially established when the structural precautions committee was formed in 1935, and since
November 1936 a section of the Journal's review of periodicals was devoted to discussions of ARP in other journals across the world. 20 It was in this context that Garforth spoke before a full Portland
Place and began by stressing that the air raids experienced in the last war would bear little resemblance to those to come in the next.
He outlined the expected effects of a variety of bombs, and appealed to architects to take up the question of structural precautions. While emphasising that he hoped precautions would prove unnecessary, the belief that there would no more than seven to ten minutes warning of a raid, meant that schemes ought to be prepared in any case. 21 In the discussion after Garforth's speech, anxiety about air raids was articulated through support for thorough architectural studies of structural precautions. Throughout the discussion, there was a sense of urgency, and of the importance of instilling a national mentality which went beyond 'air-mindedness', to 'air raidmindedness'. 22 The arguments that structural precautions needed to be made in peace due to the speed of a potential attack, cast ARP as a fixed element in architectural thinking and design for the future. The preliminary discussions between the ARP Department and the RIBA in 1936 were 17 The National Archives, London (TNA), Cabinet Papers (CAB) 24/255, R.R. to send representatives. In the introduction to the subsequent publication in the Journal of the lectures and discussions, which extended to fifty two pages, the conference was described as 'the biggest task ever laid on the RIBA, or the profession by the government of this country'.
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On the first day of the conference, architects Thomas Scott and Eric Bird outlined the key issues facing architects with regards to passive defence. The consensus was that architects must use their skill and expertise in any way possible to attempt to combat what Scott described as 'the hideous and tremendous forces of air attack as depicted by the popular Press'. The holding of such a large conference in peacetime was indicative of the increasingly mainstream position of ARP in public discourse, particularly in relation to the future development of technology and the built environment. Architects at the conference situated structural precautions against bombardment as central to the future of architecture. Scott stressed in his speech how 'peacetime precautions' were clearly preferable to 'emergency measures' rushed into place when a war was declared. Since air power had superseded older notions of war, it could not be assumed that there would be time to prepare. One of the consequences of the speed and unpredictability of attack that air power enabled was that the threat may rise or fall in line with the contemporary political and international circumstances, but it would never be truly diminished. Architects took account of this by bringing ARP into more ordinary considerations in building design.
Scott argued that the inclusion of structural precautions in design should be 'a new and permanent factor in the design and construction of buildings'. This could be done, he argued, 'without detriment to their artistic quality and efficiency'. The assertion of the permanence of ARP, reflected how air power had ushered in an era of constant danger and vulnerability. Scott's assertion later in his speech that the problems of structural precautions were strictly architectural, and were not an 'engineering or military problem', further demonstrated that ARP was considered an ongoing civilian task with a potential technological or design fix. 24 The inclusion of structural precautions against air attack was recasting the way the aesthetic values of buildings were understood. In his address on the principles of structural ARP, Eric Bird described 'the ideal building from an ARP point of view', as: The discussions at the conference suggest that RIBA architects were coming to view ARP as a largely civilian matter, something which needed to be incorporated alongside other considerations in the design and construction of new buildings. The conference at the RIBA was an example of how ARP was being separated from other defence measures, and the boundaries between civilian and military planning were disintegrating. In town planning, established urban problems, principally congestion and slum living, were reframed by the threat of air raids in a way which presented solutions to vulnerability as sensible urban development policy regardless of the immediate threat of air raids. These debates grew louder after the crisis of 1938 as the focus on ARP and civil defence intensified.
Crisis, Civil Defence and Town Planning
A government review of civil defence measures taken during the Munich crisis exposed widespread uncertainty about the predicted effects of future air raids and how best to counter them. 26 The government's view of modern war which could begin 'with little or no warning and without a declaration of war', meant that sufficient measures must be taken in peacetime to limit Britain's vulnerability to an unforeseen attack. The unpredictability of war, together with the unprecedented reach of air forces, and the legitimisation of cities as targets, contributed to the government's belief that 'from the first moment of hostilities the life of every section of the community may be gravely 7 affected'. Whereas in previous years emergency measures could be left to improvisation in the days before and the early stages of a conflict, the report asserted that in an era of air power the completion of civil defence measures may 'have to be carried out in full in peace'. 27 The need for a rapid transition between a peace and a war footing was such that large-scale civil defence preparations, with ARP high amongst them, must be in place and ready to set in motion at a moment's notice. The whole notion of a distinction between peacetime and wartime had been troubled by the potential immediacy of air war and the reach of the bombers.
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As the need for a rapid transition between peace and war became a dominant concern following the 1938 crisis, it followed that the exigencies of war must bleed into the structures of everyday life and government in peace. But as the debates amongst architects, the government, and the military at the RIBA demonstrate, this process was underway before the Munich emergency and the evident failings in civil defence preparations it exposed. The 1938 crisis did, however, focus the minds of parliament on ARP and the new language of civil defence. After the crisis, various departments were asked by the Committee of Imperial Defence to quickly produce reports before a conference was held to discuss the findings. The review drew three primary conclusions: a new approach needed to be taken to the issue of secrecy; the responsibility for civilian evacuation should be transferred to the Minster for Health; and plans for the movement of the government in the event of war should be re-considered. 29 The recommendation that secrecy levels around war preparations should be lowered reflected how air power was fundamentally transforming government approaches to, and understandings of, the boundaries between war and peace, military and civilian.
The report argued that secrecy was a major barrier to the cooperative functioning of civilian and military planning, and had a significant impact on both 'the planning work and the efficiency of the measures themselves in a crisis'. 30 But the lowering of the borders of secrecy only contributed to an ongoing process of amalgamation and coordination. While debates continued over air war strategy and its effectiveness, public calls for air raid shelters and increased government focus on defence at home informed the development of new civil defence policies. The preparations for passive defence against air raids represent a clear demonstration of the conflicts within government and the resonance fears about aerial war had on the perception of the future of cities. 8 into the civil defence response to the crisis reiterated a key theme from the architectural discussions, namely the importance of having a national civil defence infrastructure that enabled a rapid transition from peace to war. A national protective infrastructure meant structural precautions built permanently into cities, and an effective bureaucracy to coordinate offices across the country.
Attempts to create such a national ARP organisation had been developing before the crisis.
In 9 criticized on the ground of hygiene, efficiency, and the germination of slums, had been reconfigured by the growth of air power. The same congested areas that had caused concern in the nineteenth century, which Eric Bird described as 'the rotten old cores of towns consisting of huddled buildings of poor construction', were re-designated as the most vulnerable points to air attack. With the expectation of war hardening, Bird argued at the end of 1938 that 'mankind would even bless the threat of air-bombing' if it had forced them to rebuild their towns, 'with widely-spaced multi-floor framed buildings in the centres and gardens suburbs on the outskirts'. 33 The fear of imminent war only made clear and urgent the already well-rehearsed drawbacks of such thickly populated urban areas.
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The gravity of ARP lent weight to a scientific approach to design, and the self-image of architects and planners as essential to the future of the country. The crisis had shown how urgent planning for defence was. The task for architects and planners was now, as William Holford said in a speech to the RIBA in December,
To plan the fabric of civilian health and civilian protection, to plan for education and housing, to plan for large-scale evacuation (not only as regards camp accommodation but for the whole altered pattern of daily life which an emergency might create), to plan new towns and cities -in a word to plan the militant peace which to-day is the only alternative to a barbarous war. Countryside' was the aim of town planners. One of the examples given for the potential of a common approach to achieve common aims was the introduction of small parks, playing fields and allotments, which were described as both 'sound planning and [beneficial] to safety'. 41 The question of passive defence against air raids was presented as both a feature of design and planning that was necessarily becoming embedded in practice, and as a solution to the historic problems of congestion and poor quality building in the cities. The planning image of cities had been altered by the continuing and unknowable threat from the air, as planning and design features were reinterpreted through the vulnerability of cities.
When war was declared, the return to shallow trenches dug in parks, windows boarded up and sandbags stacked in doorways and on street corners, revealed how, despite all the debates very little defensive architecture had made it off paper. If the fundamental question of bomb shelters remained unresolved, the importance of taking people out of the cities was demonstrated by the evacuation schemes which quickly moved 1,473,000 people away from the city-targets, along with an estimated 2,000,000 unofficial evacuees. 42 The rapid movement of children, mothers and teachers in the first days of September was a central part of the government's passive defence policies against air raids, which, like the town planning policies of dispersal and decongestion, was presented as a trend for the future outside of the immediate emergency.
Reporting the start of evacuation, the Manchester Guardian stressed how that evacuation of the cities 'will become a great defensive advantage to this country in any struggle'. 43 Even on the verge of the war, air raid precautions were discussed as an increasingly consistent feature in the future of Britain, a future of aerial war that was not necessarily contingent on a state of war being declared. While millions hurried away, the cities they were evacuating were left to bear the brunt of the first waves of attack. The transformation experienced by the cities would be immediate, with, in the words of the Manchester Guardian, the 'congested and dangerous districts of the East End, of Tyneside, of Clydebank', finding 'a new spaciousness'. 44 In language reminiscent of planners and campaigners for social reform, anticipated air raids offered the opportunity for a policy of permanent dispersal to take root, and the oppressive density of urban living to be relieved.
The discussion of evacuation in the years before the war followed the idea that wartime emergency measures should continue to have a purpose during peace. Governmental discussions about structural precautions in planning and architecture situated peacetime works within the context of vulnerability to air attack. The need to conceive structural precautions with a dualfunctionality, both for peace and for war, in order to justify the expense and effectively prepare for the future in an era of air power, was reflected in proposals for permanent bomb shelters to be constructed under cities. The search for shelter led underground and extended the transformation of the built environment beneath the streets and buildings of the city. 42 While still a significant number it was some way short of the 3,500,000 people the government had planned to move, and indeed it was some time before the shortfall in take-up was realized, Richard Titmuss, Problems 
Imagining Safety Beneath the City
The story of huddled shelterers in London's underground network, crowded under railway bridges, in chalk caves, and elsewhere, is a key image of the 'Blitz spirit' and the effect air war had on the daily lives of civilian populations. Dietmar Süβ has argued that 'the temporary dispersal of wartime society under the earth signified a massive mobilization of urban daily life'. Subterranean spaces were, he writes, 'an object of propaganda, sites for the promise of protection and the establishment of normative gender roles'. 45 But they were also places dug into the heart of the city which became a part of the architecture of survival. From the open sky above the rooftops to the tunnels below the streets, the city in its entirety was transfigured into a space of citizenship, death and survival. The people submerging themselves into the city, were carrying out what Thomas Pynchon described in Gravity's Rainbow as a 'progressive knotting into' the darkened spaces of the metropolis. 46 Amongst the many proposed shelter schemes, the Tecton plans for Finsbury were perhaps the most carefully devised. 47 Rather than considering the well-known Finsbury scheme, this section will discuss more vernacular proposals to create underground space that could have dual functions for peace and war.
By doing this, it extends the argument that the perception of ordinary urban architecture was transformed in anticipation of war as architects imagined the hidden ARP infrastructure that a modern city would require in the age of air war.
After the RIBA conference on ARP in 1938, a series of correspondence to the Journal reflected how architects were re-interpreting the city's built environment. With the debate about the relative merits and dangers of different types of shelter, the more ordinary features of the city gained new significance. Fellow of the RIBA, H. Austen Hall, wrote about the potential to build pedestrian subways which could double as bomb shelters when required. 48 A letter in support of his proposal stressed the dual peace and war functions of subways, and suggested that large underground shelters could be used as car parks in peacetime. 49 Ideas about the potential of the road network and underground car parks to provide shelter were being discussed outside the letters pages of architectural journals; it was a topic of debate in the London County Council (LCC) both in the build- 13 up to the war, and when the bombing intensified. The images of safety underground continued to appeal to planners during the war, as subterranean space became understood through its association with safety from bombing. The metamorphosis of space extended down into the submerged networks of pipes that constituted the hidden bowels of the city.
One idea which received consideration in the build-up to war was the proposal to build large underground car parks beneath public squares in London, which would have a second use as bomb shelters. Although implausible and ultimately rejected these schemes reflect how the problems of finance and time, as bombs could fall at any moment, prompted a reappraisal of city infrastructure.
John Anderson praised plans he saw for underground garages by a London firm Messrs W.W. Baldwin and Associates, in a letter to Walter Elliot, MP in November 1938. Anderson was impressed by the plans and their suitability for use as shelters, which could be built on a large scale at little or no cost to the public. These plans belonged, Anderson said, to 'the region of long-term policy', suggesting that such constructions could be beneficial to Britain long after the immediate emergency. 50 The dual considerations of traffic congestion and air raid precautions seemed for a time to make these proposals popular in government. A memorandum in early November that addressed the economic issues of the schemes stated that: 'an immense aggregate of absolute Air Raid protection can be provided, together with a complete solution of the Car Parking problem, without cost to the Government or Local Authorities, and therefore without any increase in either rates or taxes'. 51 The underlined promise of free provision of both car parking space and public air raid shelters was eventually tempered by the technical studies, which suggested that the proposed shelters would be far too shallow to offer any meaningful protection from bombs.
One particular scheme which was discussed at length, however, was that presented by crowding a large number of people into a garage, meant that the scheme was not developed.
53
Proposals for remaking London's public squares into spaces permanently prepared to be transformed into bomb shelters, with minimal time needed to enact the change, reflects how local and national government perceptions of urban space were impacted upon by the anticipation of future aerial war.
The arguments in favour of urban planning were expanding to include long-term security concerns.
The Thames was a strategically crucial aspect of London's defence. Discussions in the LCC before the war about the bridges and tunnels over and under the Thames reflected the importance attached to traffic flows, and also illustrated how the meaning and perception of underground space had been altered by the danger of air war. Preparations were well underway for emergency measures to ensure traffic across the river in war by the mid-1930s, with plans for temporary bridges at key sites. 54 In addition to the bridges, the tunnels under the Thames (most notably the Blackwall and Rotherhithe tunnels), were identified by the ARP Department as potential bomb shelters.
A plan for a new ventilation system for tunnels under the Thames was immediately interpreted by Commander A. Steele-Perkins as a device which could be used to prevent poison gas from seeping into the tunnels. The Chief Engineer T. Pierson-Frank had not envisioned tunnels as shelters, but he acknowledged in his reply to Steele-Perkins that 'it might be possible for them to be used as shelters as you suggest'. 55 In 1938, however, the ARP Department confirmed that the tunnels under the Thames would be unsuitable as bomb shelters, as they were simply too liable to flooding to be seriously considered. 56 However, in 1937 the Highway Development Survey of Greater London (the Bressey Report) had suggested that the new tunnel roads should be bomb proof, and permanently available as bomb shelters.
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The development of the road networks which were essential to the continued prosperity and success of London was associated closely with protection from aerial bombardment, both in terms of physical protection under the city, and the maintenance of life, communication and production. 
15
Committee consulted with the Home Office, who informed them that emphasis was to be placed on the maintenance of traffic and communications across the city, and as such the tunnels ought not to be used as shelters. 58 The government's focus on traffic flows and the economic life of the city over the potential of the material infrastructure of the city to be transformed into protective space was again apparent in the discussions of the Underground stations as shelters, and the response to the popular requisitioning of the platforms by London residents.
Following the 1938 crisis, the debate about the importance of providing shelters, while keeping the city functioning, was demonstrated in discussions about whether or not London's tube stations should be made available as public air raid shelters. A meeting was held at the Ministry of Transport in July 1939 to debate the use of the underground network in wartime. 59 The main points of discussion were whether or not stations should be made available to the public as air raid shelters, and whether they should be used as first aid points. High-level representatives from the Ministry of Transport, the Home Office, the police, the Ministry of Health and the London Passenger Transport
Board attended the meeting. There was disagreement about how to deal with the likely clamour for refuge in the stations, despite a broad agreement that keeping the tube functioning was a more pressing concern than use of the stations as shelters. 60 The delegates at the meeting were responding to a memorandum circulated by the Chairman of the London Passenger Transport Board, Lord Albert Ashfield. Ashfield outlined the danger that damage to water and sewage pipes held for the underground network, and provided details of work carried out by the London County Council and the Metropolitan Water Board to evaluate stations and their vulnerability. 61 The threat of flooding to the tube network was the primary concern and Ashfield's proposal for structural precautions to be taken to safeguard against this were supported at the meeting. The relatively straightforward provision of water-tight steel doors would enable stations to remain open and traffic to continue. The main danger to the continuing functionality of the underground network was a terrified public streaming into the stations seeking safety and thus clogging the system.
The problematic nature of Ashfield's tentative suggestion that some stations be set aside for shelters while others were held back for traffic was raised in the July meeting. The expectation that 'a panicked public would not discriminate between refuge and traffic stations' meant that such a scheme appeared unworkable, and a more flexible and pragmatic approach would be needed.
Despite the difficulties expected in stopping stations being used as shelters, the meeting agreed that
keeping the stations open to traffic was of primary importance. The suggestion that stations be used as first aid posts was dismissed quickly.
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The discussions about the use of the Underground in war illustrated both the primacy given to maintaining vital services and how urban infrastructure was recast by the fear of war. With the development of the Civil Defence Bill in 1939, another aspect of the discussion of public shelters in tube stations becomes apparent. Air raid shelters, as advanced in the 1939 Bill, were a private rather than a public matter. The situation of air raid shelters in the domestic sphere, with the provision of individual family Anderson shelters, the focus on protection in the home, and the absence of large public shelters, reflected concerns about the susceptibility of the urban population to civil unrest when under fire. 63 As Susan Grayzel argues, the 'primary unit left to face the air raids remained the household'. The focus on the domestic and private sphere reflected the changed role of civilians and domestic space in war. 64 The fear of crowds was an important element in the government's emphasis that civil defence should be focussed in the private sphere, as was the view that masses of people gathering in public shelters during air raids would damage productivity. 
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The militarization of urban space in the twentieth century has become a major focus for research, and by highlighting some of the impacts of anticipated aerial war on perceptions of cities, this article points to an important moment in this history. 67 Holford's call to plan a 'militant peace' as the 'only alternative to a barbarous war' resonates with more contemporary concerns. The fears of always imminent and yet unpredictable attacks has contributed to the development of ever more sophisticated and total defensive infrastructures in modern cities in a way which recalls Forster's description of the '1939 State'. This 'State' was not an isolated period between peace and war, but was an image of society under constant threat. 'Prepare! Prepare!' became a version of 'business as usual' before the bombs began to fall, and in this process, the distinction between planning for peace and planning for war became increasingly hard to determine. 
